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INTERNET MADE FLORIDA’S SUNSHINE LAW TOO BRIGHT?
Michael Polatsek*
Abstract
In recent years, privately owned websites around the country have
begun to gather arrest records directly from law enforcement websites
and republish them on their own sites. Often, the images are displayed
without regard to the ultimate disposition of the arrestee’s case. Images
and arrest records of individuals who were eventually convicted or
acquitted are stored on these websites indefinitely, and specifically
designed search algorithms ensure that potentially damaging
information is just a click away on commonly used search engines such
as Google. Some websites categorize images under derogatory headings
based solely on the individual’s appearance and allow users to leave
comments. Most provide links to social media outlets such as Facebook
and Twitter, which allow users to further disseminate this information.
Although this information is in the public record, these new privately
owned websites have dramatically increased the visibility of mugshots
and arrest records. The information can severely damage a person’s
reputation and greatly limit employment opportunities. It can also cause
embarrassment and psychological trauma. Understandably, many
individuals who are displayed on such websites want the information
taken down. In response to these wishes, additional websites have
emerged offering to have the images removed for a fee. The amount
charged for this service is often quite high, which forecloses many
individuals’ opportunities to have them removed. The website owners
currently use liberal public records laws in many states to justify their
actions and claim that they provide a public service by facilitating
access to information in the public record. This scheme is known as the
Mugshot Racket.
Using Florida as a case study, this Note examines many issues in
connection with the Mugshot Racket. The threshold issue is whether
this activity is illegal or simply immoral. In attempting to answer this
question, this Note explores the evolving relationship between public
records laws and privacy rights in the Internet age. It asks whether an
individual has a right to privacy in his mugshot and explores potential
causes of action against the perpetrators of the Mugshot Racket under
Florida’s extortion law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. Finally, this Note argues that legislatures should
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outlaw the exploitation of one’s past for personal profit, and explores
other nonlegislative, nonlitigious solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
A few years ago in South Florida, a young graduate student met
some old college acquaintances for a night on the town. He had not seen
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these friends for some time, and the evening was supposed to be one of
remembrance and good times. Unfortunately, as sometimes happens at
such reunions, the student got carried away and had a little too much to
drink. While walking from one bar to the next, the student was arrested
for disorderly conduct. He spent the night in the Broward County jail
and was released the next day.
Two years later, the student had long since complied with his courtordered punishment and put this single indiscretion behind him. That
was until a simple Google1 search of his name brought the incident
rushing back. On the first page of search results was a link to a website
that displayed not only his mugshot2 taken that night but also details
regarding the charges filed against him.
Understandably, this may seem surprising. Nevertheless, it is now
common for state and federal organizations to publish matters of public
record electronically, often in response to legislation requiring them to
make official records more accessible.3 Mugshots and booking
information are part of the public record, and in most states members of
the public who wish to look them up may freely do so.4 This information
has traditionally been available from the county clerk or local law
enforcement agencies around the country.5 Historically, those interested
in reviewing the public record had to make requests for what they

1. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). Google is an Americanrun website that offers a variety of services such as Internet searches, cloud computing, and
software and advertising technologies. Individuals make use of the site’s services all across the
globe. In the United States and globally, Google has achieved a first place ranking when
considering Internet traffic relative to other sites. See Site Info: Google, ALEXA,
http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/google.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
2. Law enforcement organizations have used mugshots to identify and document
criminal suspects since the nineteenth century. See HENRY T.F. RHODES, ALPHONSE BERTILLON:
FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC DETECTION 74 (1956). Alphonse Bertillon, a French investigator and
innovator in the field of criminal investigation, has been credited as one of the first to compile
and utilize mugshots for the identification of criminals. See id. at 83 (“[A] ‘speaking likeness’
was precisely what Alphonse Bertillon was aiming at. . . . Photography, as Bertillon devised it,
was standardized and accurate. He planned to photograph every accused person in full face and
profile, which was in itself an important innovation.”). Bertillon’s goal was to supply a method
whereby law enforcement could identify repeat offenders. See Joseph Peterson, Preface to
ALPHONSE BERTILLON’S INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAKING DESCRIPTIONS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF
CRIMINALS AND OTHERS (Gallus Muller trans., AMS Press 1977) (1889).
3. For example, Florida Statutes § 119.01(2)(a) states that “[a]utomation of public
records must not erode the right of access to those records. As each agency increases its use of
and dependence on electronic recordkeeping, each agency must provide reasonable public
access to records electronically maintained.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01(2)(a) (West, Westlaw
through ch. 272 of 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.).
4. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 128–29 (2004).
5. See id.
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wanted directly from these agencies.6 While the information was
generally freely accessible, individuals whose arrest records were in the
possession of law enforcement agencies benefitted from the “practical
obscurity” associated with the extra effort an interested party would
have to make to obtain the records.7
Today, the Internet has largely eroded the protection afforded by
this “practical obscurity.”8 Also, a growing number of states have
passed laws that increase the public’s access to criminal records.9 As
Internet use has become more prevalent, many law enforcement
organizations and county clerks have chosen to make arrest records and
court records available on their respective websites.10 Thus, the Internet
has greatly increased the circulation and availability of the public
record.11
Recently, privately owned websites around the country have begun
to gather these arrest records directly from law enforcement websites
and republish them on their own sites.12 Often, the images are displayed
6. See Justin Silverman, The ‘Mugshot Racket’: Paying to Keep Public Records Less
Public, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:15PM), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/
2011/mugshot-racket-paying-keep-public-records-less-public.
7. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
762, 764 (1989); Jennifer Greene, Competing Interests Regarding Electronic Court Records:
Privacy Versus Open Access in Arizona, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2001, at 26 (noting the process
typically associated with requesting public records prior to the advent of the Internet).
8. See Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New
Understanding of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 456–57 (2009) (“The Web,
with its unlimited reach across time and place, can bring information to people’s fingertips,
which they can use for good or ill . . . . Information that was public but practically obscure will
no longer be practically obscure on the Web, and the question with each new issue is whether
this matters.”).
9. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 207 (2008). The authors note:
An increasing number of states are making it easier for any person, for any
purpose, to obtain anyone’s criminal record. A 2006 . . . survey found that
twenty-five of thirty-four responding states made name-only searches of
criminal history records available to the public. Fifteen states allowed searches
by means of telephone, mail, or website queries, and ten states provided for
searches of court records. Twenty-five of the thirty-four responding states also
allowed members of the public to initiate fingerprint-based record searches of
state criminal records.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10. See Greene, supra note 7, at 26 (noting the privacy concerns associated with making
court records accessible online to the public).
11. Even though law enforcement websites themselves increase the visibility of mugshots
and booking information in many states, they still arguably retain a higher degree of anonymity
than commercial mugshot websites.
12. Stephanie Francis Ward, Hoist Your Mug: Websites Will Post Your Name and Photo;
Others Will Charge You to Remove Them, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 2:59 AM),
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without regard to the ultimate disposition of the defendant’s case.13
Images and arrest records of defendants who are eventually convicted or
acquitted are stored on these websites indefinitely, and specifically
designed search algorithms ensure that potentially damaging
information is just a click away on commonly used search engines such
as Google.14 Even if defendants’ cases are dismissed or otherwise
dropped, their mugshots and arrest records are fair game if they appear
on a law enforcement website.15
Perhaps worst of all, individuals who (understandably) wish to have
their records removed from these sites are often charged for the
service.16 Many sister websites, purporting to be defenders of personal
privacy, have sprung up in response to the proliferation of the mugshot
sites; in reality, however, these sites are often loosely affiliated with the
offending websites.17 They offer to remove potentially damaging
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/hoist_your_mug_websites_will_post_your_name_
and_photo_others_will_charge_yo. Through a process known as “screen scraping,” these
websites automatically and continuously sift through numerous law enforcement and county
court websites around the country and compile already publicized arrest information for later
republication. See Josh Green, Mugshots Inc: ‘Legalized Extortion’ or Constitutional
Privilege?, GWINNETT DAILY POST (July 22, 2012), http://www.gwinnettdailypost.com/news/
2012/jul/21/mugshots-inc-legalized-extortion-or; Silverman, supra note 6. The number of
photographs lifted from law enforcement websites can be quite high: http://florida.arrests.org
reportedly searches through at least thirty-seven counties in Florida, compiling 1,500 mugshots
each day. David Kravets, Mug-Shot Industry Will Dig Up Your Past, Charge You to Bury It
Again, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/mugshots.
13. See Green, supra note 12; Jon Silman, Dropped Arrests Leave Marks on Citizens,
GAINESVILLE SUN (Dec. 16, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://www.gainesville.com/article/20121216/
ARTICLES/121219704.
14. Adam Tanner, Mug Shot Sites Reward a Few and Rankle Many, SUN SENTINEL, Sept.
21, 2012, at D3. News media organizations also publicize mugshots on television and on their
respective websites. This practice differs significantly, however, from what privately owned
mugshot sites do. The mugshots that are posted on news media websites such as the Sun
Sentinel’s “are part of more complete coverage of alleged crimes and automatically expire after
a predetermined length of time.” Id.
15. See Martin A. Holland, Note, Identity, Privacy and Crime: Privacy and Public
Records in Florida, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 235, 240 (2012) (“There is no difference
whether the person in the mugshot is later found guilty, not guilty, declared innocent, or has the
charges dropped entirely.”); Silman, supra note 13. It is worth pointing out that not every
website that reposts mugshots is engaged in the same morally questionable (and likely illegal)
practices as privately owned websites that repost mugshots taken from law enforcement
websites. For example, www.jailbase.com, which claims to provide an informational service for
“the public, family, friends, and victims” of arrested and booked individuals, does not charge a
fee for removal, but instead takes photos down voluntarily after six months. JAILBASE,
http://www.jailbase.com/en/about (last visited May 19, 2014). The site also removes the
webpage displaying the information from “major [Internet] search engine results (like
[G]oogle).” Id.
16. Tanner, supra note 14.
17. See Kravets, supra note 12 (“On the surface, the mugshot sites and the reputation
firms are mortal enemies. But behind the scenes, they have a symbiotic relationship that wrings
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information in exchange for a fee, but they do not guarantee to keep the
records from appearing on similar websites.18 The fee is often very
high.19 For many people, this can foreclose the opportunity to have the
information removed.20 This practice has become commonly known as
the Mugshot Racket.21
Owners of these new mugshot websites claim that they provide a
public service by facilitating the dissemination of publicly available
information of interest to law-abiding members of society.22 This
argument makes little sense. As should be obvious, this function is
already served by law enforcement and county court websites that
publish the same material.23 Additionally, many of these private
websites provide links to social media outlets such as Facebook,24
Twitter,25 and others that allow visitors to “share” or “like” individual
cash out of the people exposed.”); Silverman, supra note 6 (stating that “photos are uploaded to
the web on tens, maybe even hundreds, of police and sherriff [sic] websites, giving rise to two
new online businesses: the mugshot aggregation website and its opposite number, the mugshot
removal website”).
18. See Silverman, supra note 6. Some people have sought professional legal help to have
their photos removed from mugshot websites; however, the cost of hiring an attorney to address
the problem can far exceed the fees charged by the identity-protecting websites. Kravets, supra
note 12. Some attorneys even participate in the racket themselves by using client fees to pay for
the mugshot removal. Green, supra note 12.
19. For example, some websites charge fees as high as $399 to remove mugshots from
www.florida.arrests.com, one of the largest privately run mugshot websites in Florida. Kravets,
supra note 12; see also Holland, supra note 15, at 240.
20. See Silverman, supra note 6. Due to this system, the mugshot websites don’t have the
“faces of all those who have the financial means and desire to pay for their mugshot’s
removal . . . . [O]nly the wealthy and informed get to limit their indiscretions to the relative
obscurity of a single county website. When it comes to open records, these varying degrees of
publicness are bothersome.” Id.
21. Id. (“mugshot racket”); Kravets, supra note 12 (“mug-shot racket”).
22. See Tanner, supra note 14.
23. The publication of booking photos on private mugshot websites simply makes the
already public images even more accessible. See Ward, supra note 12.
24. Facebook is a social networking website that allows users to connect and remain in
contact with one another. As stated on the website’s homepage, the site’s goal is “to give people
the power to share and make the world more open and connected.” FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/facebook (last visited May 19, 2014). Facebook’s dedication to
openness, and the implication this holds for those who are depicted on mugshot websites that
provide these features, should not be taken lightly. Facebook users are required to use their real
identities when creating profiles, and those caught with phony accounts usually have their
memberships either suspended or terminated. See REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE
NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 150 (2012). Mark
Zuckerberg, Facebook’s creator, is dedicated to what he has termed “‘radical transparency’: the
idea that humanity would be better off if everybody were more transparent about who they are
and what they do.” Id.
25. “Twitter instantly connects people everywhere to what’s most meaningful to them.
Any registered user can send a Tweet, which is a message of 140 characters or less that is public
by default and can include other content like photos, videos, and links to other websites.”
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mugshots, greatly increasing their potential audience.26 Some websites
even allow users to upload mugshots or leave derogatory captions under
the images.27 Many websites group mugshots into categories with
offensive and disparaging titles based solely on the nature of the image,
rather than the underlying offense.28 It is difficult to imagine how the
public is served by providing a conduit through which people may
ridicule members of society who have been judged or are awaiting
judgment by the criminal justice system. The consequences of having
one’s arrest record displayed on such websites can be quite serious.29 It
can limit employment opportunities and can be damaging in a host of
other ways.30 In addition to embarrassment, such negative publicity can
also cause substantial injury to one’s reputation.31
The websites themselves are covered in advertisements from various
organizations that pay the owners for the right to market their

Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited May 19, 2014).
26. A visit to many mugshot websites currently active on the Internet will demonstrate
these features. A simple Google search will reveal many of them. See, e.g.,
YOUR
SITE
FOR
CONSTANTLY
UPDATED
MUGSHOTS,
LOOKWHOGOTBUSTED:
http://www.lookwhogotbusted.com (last visited May 19, 2014) (hover cursor over the green
rectangular box titled “Share” to view these links) (providing links to, inter alia, Facebook,
Twitter, Pinterest, Linkedin, Google+, Digg, StumbleUpon, Reddit, and Tumblr).
27. See, e.g., MUGSHOT ROW, http://mugshotrow.com (last visited May 19, 2014)
(providing a link to upload mugshots to the website and allowing users to leave comments under
each picture).
28. Kravets, supra note 12 (“Visitors to [www.florida.arrests.org] can comment on the
photos, or browse them by tags like ‘Celebrity,’ ‘Hotties,’ ‘Trannies,’ ‘Tatted Up’ and ‘WTF.’
Most of the photos are of adults, but children as young as 11 are also on display if they’re
accused of adult crimes.”).
29. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 9, at 177 (“[Criminal records] are also rapidly becoming
a negative curriculum vitae (negative c.v.) used to determine eligibility for occupational
licenses, social welfare benefits, employment, and housing.” (footnote omitted)); see also Skyler
McDonald, Note, Defamation in the Internet Age: Why Roommates.com Isn’t Enough to
Change the Rules for Anonymous Gossip Websites, 62 FLA. L. REV. 259, 276 (2010) (“The
Internet, and especially its interactive websites and blogs, allows Everyday Joes equal access to
give their opinions and engage in discourse that is unprecedented in history—unprecedented
because on the Internet, there is no gatekeeper and virtually no limit on the audience.” (footnote
omitted)).
30. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 9, at 177–79 (noting that the increasing availability of
criminal records may restrict persons with criminal records from obtaining housing,
employment, occupational licenses, and social welfare benefits).
31. See Michael Zimmer & Anthony Hoffman, Privacy, Context, and Oversharing:
Reputational Challenges in a Web 2.0 World, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE
OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 175, 175 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds.,
2011) (“Powerful and innovative Web 2.0 tools and services have made our personal
information—previously scattered and hard to locate—increasingly discoverable, visible, and
linkable. Various Web 2.0 platforms have emerged that make visible personal information that
was previously disclosed, but that until now has remained obscure.”).
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products,32 and the owners make money every time visitors to the
websites view or click these links.33 Moreover, owners often receive a
percentage of the fee charged by their sister websites that purport to
protect individuals’ identities by removing potentially damaging
information.34 Regardless of which activity generates the most income
for the mugshot websites, the removal fees certainly add to their
coffers.35
There are many issues that come to mind when considering this new
practice. This Note addresses whether this type of activity is illegal and
whether it should be regulated through the legislative process.36 Website
owners currently hide behind liberal public records laws in many states
to justify their actions, effectively using them as a shield.37 This Note
also addresses whether one can have a legitimate privacy right in one’s
mugshot and, if so, how state governments can reconcile this right with
the right of access to public records. Finally this Note addresses whether
charging a fee to remove the information from the websites is a form of
extortion by use of the public record.
While these issues are not limited to a single state or jurisdiction,
this Note limits its focus to Florida, a state with some of the most
expansive open public records laws in the country.38 Part I explores
32. See Kravets, supra note 12 (noting that the bulk of income for one mugshot website
comes from advertising). Courts around the country have mentioned the potentially harmful
effect that the dissemination of a mugshot can have upon a person’s reputation. See, e.g., Times
Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999) (“As in
the clich[é], a picture is worth a thousand words. For that reason, a mug shot’s stigmatizing
effect can last well beyond the actual criminal proceedings. Furthermore, just because somebody
has conceded guilt does not negate that person’s interest in nondisclosure of the mug shot.”).
But see State v. Adler, 558 P.2d 817, 820 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that “the constitutional
right of privacy does not include the interest an individual possesses in his arrest record
including his photograph and fingerprints”).
33. Kravets, supra note 12.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Silverman, supra note 6 (“The best access to records—be them [sic] town board
meeting minutes or mugshots—shouldn’t be through a site that is paid for protecting the privacy
of one individual over another. It should come from a government body that prohibits the
patronage in favor of accuracy and context.”).
37. Id. (“These companies are now emerging in Florida due to the state’s broad public
record laws that allow individual mugshots to be easily obtained. When it comes to these
photos, most states consider your face—be it beat-up, distraught, or half-shaven—to be a public
record.”); see also Kravets, supra note 12 (“Exploiting Florida’s liberal public-records laws and
Google’s search algorithms, a handful of entrepreneurs are making real money by publicly
shaming people who’ve run afoul of Florida law. Florida.arrests.org, the biggest player, now
hosts more than 4 million mugs.”).
38. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the 2013 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.) (“It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal
records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person.”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
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whether one has a privacy right in their mugshot. To answer this
question, this Note surveys federal appellate cases under the Freedom of
Information Act39 (FOIA). Part II presents a history of the Florida
Sunshine Law, outlines the evolution of Florida’s constitutional right to
privacy, and discusses the potential conflict between Florida’s dual
commitment to open government and the protection of personal privacy.
Part III explores whether mugshot websites’ actions are a form of
extortion, how the images can be highly prejudicial when displayed
under these circumstances, and how there is often no alternative to
paying the fee to have the records removed. Part IV presents a cause of
action that may be available against mugshot websites under Florida’s
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act40 (Florida RICO
Act), discusses legislation designed to prevent the exploitation of one’s
past for personal profit, and explores other methods to curb the Mugshot
Racket.
I. PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC RECORD
History, culture, and varying legal systems also
influence the extent of privacy protection . . . . [P]rivacy
protection in the United States is complex and
decentralized. The laws and regulations governing the use
of personal information are many and varied, usually
pertaining to a specific industry or issue. This sectoral
approach results in a patchwork of uneven, inconsistent,

Ass’n v. Associated Press, 18 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“Florida courts
construe the public records law liberally in favor of the state’s policy of open government.”);
Kravets, supra note 12 (noting the breadth of Florida’s “liberal” public records laws). In
addition, Florida Statutes § 119.011(12) defines a public record as “all documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or
other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission, made
or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official
business by any agency.” The Florida Supreme Court has decided that this “definition limits
public information to those materials which constitute records—that is, materials that have been
prepared with the intent of perpetuating or formalizing knowledge.” Shevin v. Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980). This includes criminal records.
39. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01–.06. While this Note limits its scope to exploring whether
the mugshot websites are engaged in a form of extortion pursuant to the Florida RICO Act, this
is not the only theory of illegality being pursued in this matter. For example, an Ohio lawyer is
currently suing mugshot websites under Ohio’s right of publicity law. See Taylor Dungjen, Web
Sites Profiting from Mug Shots Sued, TOLEDO BLADE (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2012/12/05/Web-sites-profiting-from-mug-shots-sued-feescharged-to-remove-online-images.html; David Kravets, Shamed by Mugshot Sites, Arrestees Try
Novel Lawsuit, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/12/
mugshot-industry-legal-attack/.
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and often irrational privacy protection.41
The Internet has done much to erode individual privacy.42 In the age
of smart phones, instantaneous uploading, and social media outlets such
as Facebook and Twitter, it is much more difficult to keep certain
aspects of one’s life from the public eye.43 Moreover, the rapid
development of the Internet and technology in general has in many
instances greatly outpaced the legislative process.44 The result is that
much of what happens in the digital world is either entirely unregulated
or regulated by outdated legislation that is difficult to apply in new
technological contexts.45 The Mugshot Racket provides a fitting
example.
A. A Brief History of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C.
§ 552
The recent rise of the Mugshot Racket is arguably an unintended
consequence of liberal public record legislation enacted in the latter half
of the twentieth century. The movement toward a more open
government began with the creation of the Special Subcommittee on
Government Information in 1955.46 Headed by Congressman John E.
Moss, the Subcommittee’s goal was to reverse the growing trend in
Washington to withhold information.47 Throughout the ten years
41. Michael H. Armacost, Foreword to FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE,
at vii, vii (1997).
42. See FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST
CONTESTED RIGHT 234 (2009). The author states:
Any individual can make what seems to be a rational decision to post personal
information to a Web site . . . . The reality is that most people don’t realize how
little control they retain over the information they post on the Web, whether on
a social networking site or their personal Web site. As many, many people have
discovered, it is far too easy for information to be copied from one location on
the Web to another or to be spread around the globe in a seemingly endless
string of forwarded e-mails.
Id.
43. See id. (“Not only is it essentially impossible for someone to control the information
that he or she posts to the Web, it is increasingly difficult to track, let alone control, the
information that others post.”).
44. Recent Cases, Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), 121
HARV. L. REV. 930, 936 (2008) (noting that “the speed of the Internet’s development outpaces
that of congressional legislation”).
45. See id.
46. See MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE’S WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS AND THE FIGHT FOR
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER RIGHTS 53–54, 56–57 (2011).
47. See id. at 57. “[Moss] targeted what his staff called ‘silly secrecy,’ the refusal to
disclose such vital data, as modern uses of the bow and arrow and the amount of peanut butter
consumed by U.S. soldiers.” Id. at 54.
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between the establishment of the Subcommittee and the 1966 enactment
of FOIA, Moss and his Subcommittee faced significant opposition to
the proposed legislation.48 When Congress finally passed FOIA, the
stated purpose was to provide private citizens with greater access to “the
government’s inner-workings.”49 Specifically, FOIA obligates
“agencies of the federal government [to] make available to the public all
written information in their files unless the withholding of the
information can be authorized under one of the Act’s nine
exemptions.”50
Today, FOIA has been incorporated into the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).51 Congress drafted FOIA “to revise Section
Three of the APA [which] was regarded as a withholding statute rather
than a disclosure statute.”52 Much of § 3 contained ambiguous language.
Significantly, § 3 did not contain a “remedy for wrongful withholding
of information” by the government.53 In contrast, FOIA clearly
stipulates that “official information shall be made available ‘to the
public,’ ‘for public inspection.’”54 The nine exemptions presented in
§ 522(b) of FOIA “set up concrete, workable standards for determining
whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed,” and
FOIA provides aggrieved citizens “a speedy remedy in district courts,
where ‘the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on
the agency to sustain its action.’”55
These exceptions were included in FOIA to ensure that information
requested by members of the public served a legitimate public
48. In 1955, the issue had not yet attracted much public attention, although the press had
long since complained of the government’s refusal to provide access to documents. See id. at 56.
Also playing heavily into the government’s reluctance to grant greater access to documents were
national security concerns in light of the Cold War and the desire of the Department of Defense
to restrict the public availability of information reflecting negatively on the war effort. See id. at
57. Lastly, Moss had to contend with the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, which
greatly opposed the proposed legislation. Id. at 53.
49. Lauren Bemis, Balancing a Citizen’s Right to Know with the Privacy of an Innocent
Family: The Expansion of the Scope of Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act
Under National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 507, 509 (2005).
50. GARY R. COOPER & ROBERT R. BELAIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE
MEDIA 14 (1979). The exemptions are codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
51. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
754 (1989).
52. Bemis, supra note 49, at 509.
53. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973), superseded in part by statute, Act of November
21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, as recognized in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978).
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)).
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purpose.56 Once a request is made, the government agency in possession
of the records can decide whether to make them available or invoke one
of the exceptions.57 If the agency refuses to disclose the information, it
must prove that the reason for retention satisfies one of the exceptions.58
The party denied access may then pursue disclosure of the documents in
court, where the matter would be reviewed de novo.59
B. Splitting the Circuits—The Scope of Exemption 7(C) and Privacy
Rights in a Mugshot
The nine exemptions codified in § 552(b) of FOIA protect both
government agencies otherwise obligated to turn over records and the
private individuals whose information is contained within those
materials.60 If the requested information fits within criteria of an
exemption, then the records do not have to be disclosed.61 Exemption
7(C) relieves the government of its duty to disclose “records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”62
The United States Supreme Court has established a three-part test to
determine what constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
based upon the wording of Exemption 7(C).63 The Court held that “an
invasion is unwarranted where (1) the information sought implicates
56. Bemis, supra note 49, at 510.
57. Id.; see Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 121
(1980) (“Federal agencies . . . are granted discretion to refuse FOIA requests when the requested
material falls within one of the nine statutory exemptions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).”).
58. Bemis, supra note 49, at 510; accord Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262
(2011) (“FOIA thus mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within
one of nine exemptions.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023, 1025–26
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The Freedom of Information Act requires subject federal agencies to release
properly-requested information save to the extent that it is specifically exempted. The statutory
exemptions are to be narrowly construed, and an agency opposing divulgence bears the burden
of demonstrating that the material in issue falls with an exempted category.” (footnotes
omitted)).
59. Bemis, supra note 49, at 510–11; accord Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 643 F.3d 1142, 1147 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that district courts generally review
FOIA complaints de novo).
60. Bemis, supra note 49, at 511.
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012); FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966,
971 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that agencies who receive a FOIA request must release the material
sought “unless it falls within an exemption found in the statute”).
62. Id. § 552(b)(7)(c) (emphasis added).
63. Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 502 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989)).
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someone’s personal privacy, (2) no legitimate public interest outweighs
infringing the individual’s personal privacy interest, and (3) disclosing
the information ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’”64 Part three of the test is
essentially a balancing of the interests identified in parts one and two.65
1. United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press
While the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to decide
whether one has a privacy right in their mugshot, the Court has
addressed the related issue of inherent privacy rights in other
components of criminal records.66 In United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court
decided whether a defendant had an inherent right to privacy in his FBI
rap sheet.67 Specifically, the Court addressed whether “the disclosure of
the contents of such a file to a third party ‘could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ within the
meaning of the Freedom of Information Act” Exemption 7(C).68
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held that a defendant does have
an inherent right to privacy in his FBI rap sheet.69
Reporters Committee involved a CBS journalist and the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press’s requesting the criminal records
of members of a family suspected of executing illegal business contracts
with a crooked Pennsylvania congressman.70 The FBI denied the
request, citing Exemption 7(C).71 The Court adopted a broad
interpretation of the exemption, stating that it “encompasses any
disclosure that ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute’ such an
invasion.”72 Employing this analysis, the Court stated that in
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 756).
See id. at 504.
See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 751.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 780. Justice Stevens wrote:
Finally: The privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet
information will always be high. When the subject of such a rap sheet is a
private citizen and when the information is in the Government’s control as a
compilation, rather than as a record of “what the Government is up to,” the
privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while the
FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir.

Id.
70. Id. at 757.
71. Id. at 751, 757.
72. Id. at 756.
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determining the exemption’s applicability, courts must compare the
privacy interests of keeping one’s rap sheet confidential against the
asserted public interest in disclosure.73
In other words, although there is undoubtedly some public interest
in anyone’s criminal history, especially if the history is in some way
related to the person’s dealing with a public official or agency, FOIA’s
central purpose is to ensure that the government’s activities be open to
the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about a private
citizen locked away in a government warehouse be disclosed.74 This
decision was also based in part upon the Court’s unwillingness to
expand the scope of FOIA beyond what Congress intended.75 That
intention, as the Court has previously stated, is “to pierce the veil of
administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny.”76
If there is a right to privacy in one aspect of a person’s arrest record,
it stands to reason that there are privacy interests in others. At the
federal level, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have
interpreted Reporters Committee to find an inherent privacy right in
mugshots.77 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit has taken the opposite
approach.78
73. Id. at 762. In weighing these interests, Justice Stevens suggested that privacy rights
are more likely to be violated when criminal records are archived in an easy-to-search database,
due to a loss of obscurity. Id. at 764 (“Plainly there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.”).
74. Id. at 774.
75. See id. at 775. Regarding Congress’s intent, Justice Stevens further explained:
If respondents are entitled to have the FBI tell them what it knows about [the
defendant’s] criminal history, any other member of the public is entitled to the
same disclosure . . . . There is, unquestionably, some public interest in
providing interested citizens with answers to their questions . . . . But that
interest falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted
to serve.
Id.
76. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of
the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2nd Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 832 (10th Cir. 2012)
(holding that “when the public interest is balanced against the privacy interest in a booking
photo, [the appellant’s] request would not further the purpose of the FOIA”); Karantsalis v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that “booking
photographs . . . fall under Exemption 7(C) to the FOIA because they were gathered for law
enforcement purposes and disclosing them would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of . . . personal privacy”).
78. See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that because the respondent’s “FOIA request involved only mug shots of individuals who were
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2. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. United States
Department of Justice
In 1996, the Detroit Free Press brought suit against the U.S.
Marshals Service (USMS) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) after the
DOJ denied the Detroit Free Press’s FOIA request for the mugshots of
eight federal prisoners.79 The DOJ invoked Exemption 7(C) in defense
of its decision not to disclose the photos.80
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit listed three requirements for an agency
to properly deny a request under Exemption 7(C).81 First, the requested
records must be “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”82 Next, “the
release of the information by the federal agency must reasonably be
expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”83 Lastly, the
“intrusion into private matters must be deemed ‘unwarranted’ after
balancing the need for protection of private information against the
benefit to be obtained by disclosure of information concerning the
workings of components of our federal government.”84
While the Sixth Circuit found that mugshots fulfilled the first
requirement, the court held they did not satisfy the remaining
requirements.85 The fact that the inmates had already been identified
publicly by the USMS and had been seen in the courtroom factored
heavily in the court’s decision.86 “[T]he indictees in this matter had
already been identified by name by the federal government and their
visages had already been revealed during prior judicial appearances. No
new information that the indictees would not wish to divulge would,
therefore, be publicized by release of the mug shots . . . .”87 Moreover,
the court noted that the publication of mugshots is desirable in some
instances because publication can “serve to subject the government to
public oversight.”88
already indicted, who had already made court appearances after their arrests, and whose names
had already been made public in connection with an ongoing criminal prosecution . . . [the
photos] could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”).
79. Id. at 95.
80. Id. (noting that the DOJ “appropriately focused on two statutory exemptions” under
FOIA, one of which was Exemption 7(C)).
81. Id. at 96.
82. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 96–98.
86. Id. at 97.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 98. As an example, the court mentioned how a publicly disclosed mugshot of
Rodney King could have notified the public of the conduct of Los Angeles police officers, had
the infamous video not existed. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit stands alone among the U.S. Circuit Courts in
deciding that defendants have no inherent privacy interest in their
mugshots.89 Significantly, the court considered only the privacy rights
that may be affected by the release of mugshots in an “ongoing criminal
proceeding.”90 Notably absent is any acknowledgment by the court that
mugshots are created as a preliminary step in criminal investigations.
The photo is taken after a suspect has been arrested but before any of
the allegations leading to the arrest have been proven in court. In short,
the Sixth Circuit failed to address the effect a mugshot can have on a
defendant’s presumption of innocence, let alone its effect in the court of
public opinion.91 Arguably by narrowing the scope of its decision, the
Sixth Circuit implied that there are elevated privacy concerns if a
person’s booking photo is made public before trial, after trial, or when
an individual has been exonerated.92
3. Karantsalis v. United States Department of Justice
Karantsalis v. United States Department of Justice also involved a
request for mugshots from the USMS.93 Just as it had in Detroit Free
Press, the USMS invoked Exemption 7(C) and denied the request.94
After determining that the agency conducted an adequate search for the
requested records, the Eleventh Circuit held that the request satisfied the
Supreme Court’s three-part test for determining whether an invasion of
privacy had occurred and that the USMS properly withheld the
mugshots under the exemption.95
In applying the first part of the test, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized
the assumption of guilt that the public generally associates with a
booking photo:96
89. World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 2012).
90. Detroit Free Press, 635 F.3d at 97.
91. See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 499, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
92. See Detroit Free Press, 635 F.3d at 97 (“We need not decide today whether the
release of a mug shot by a government agency would constitute an invasion of privacy in
situations involving dismissed charges, acquittals, or completed criminal proceedings. Instead,
we need resolve only the single issue of whether such disclosure in an ongoing criminal
proceeding, in which the names of the defendants have already been divulged and in which the
defendants themselves have already appeared in open court ‘could reasonably be expected to
constitute an . . . invasion of personal privacy.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(C) (2012))).
93. Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 502–04.
96. Id. at 503. While the court acknowledged that it had not yet considered the privacy
interest in a mugshot, the court noted that it had previously mentioned that “mug shots carry a
clear implication of criminal activity.” Id. at 503 (quoting United States v. Hines, 955 F.2d
1449, 1455 (11th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[A] booking photograph is a unique and powerful type of
photograph that raises personal privacy interests distinct
from normal photographs. A booking photograph is a vivid
symbol of criminal accusation, which, when released to the
public, intimates, and is often equated with, guilt. Further, a
booking photograph captures the subject in the vulnerable
and embarrassing moments immediately after being
accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most
liberties.97
The court also pointed out that, unlike criminal records in many
states, USMS photos are not usually made available to the public.98
Importantly, it deviated from the Sixth Circuit’s analysis by asserting
that an individual still has “a continuing personal privacy interest in
preventing public dissemination of his booking photographs” that
endures after one has been convicted in a criminal proceeding.99
The court concluded that fulfilling the request would not serve a
public interest protected by FOIA, stating that “the general curiosity of
the public in [a defendant’s] facial expression during his booking
photographs is not a cognizable interest that would ‘contribute
significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of
government.’”100 In light of this analysis, the court held that the
defendants’ privacy interests outweighed the public’s interest and
upheld the DOJ’s refusal to hand over the photos.101
4. World Publishing Co. v. United States Department of Justice
The Tenth Circuit most recently considered the question of privacy
rights in mugshots. Again, the case involved a demand for booking
photos from the DOJ.102 Tulsa World, a newspaper owned by World
Publishing Company, made a FOIA request to the USMS for pictures of
six federal defendants who were awaiting trial.103 Applying the
Supreme Court’s three-part test for Exemption 7(C), the court rejected
the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation and followed the Eleventh Circuit in
97. Id.
98. Id. The fact that the DOJ does not make these photos available implies that there are
inherent privacy concerns associated with mugshots that the USMS takes into account. See id. at
499 (noting that the DOJ denied the request for mugshots because “they were gathered for law
enforcement purposes and releasing them would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of . . . personal privacy” (emphasis added)).
99. Id. at 503.
100. Id. at 504 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 775 (1989)).
101. Id. at 504–05.
102. World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 2012).
103. Id.
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finding that the defendants had important privacy interests in the
photos.104
The first part of the test was not in dispute.105 In considering the
second and third prongs of the test, the court identified the “stigmatizing
effect” a mugshot can have on an individual.106 In support of its
decision, the Tenth Circuit also cited the negative connotations often
associated with the pictures and reiterated that the USMS does not have
a history of making mugshots available to the public.107 Finally, the
court rejected Tulsa World’s proffered public interest in disclosure and
held that the proffered interest did not outweigh the individuals’ privacy
interests in keeping the images from the public eye.108
C. Circuit Decisions and the Mugshot Racket
Based upon the forgoing decisions, it would seem that the mugshot
websites violate a privacy right. It is important to keep in mind that the
Circuit Courts dealt only with the issue of a legitimate possessor of
mugshots disclosing them to the media. Mugshot sites lift booking
photos from law enforcement websites without the permission of federal
or state agencies.109 But worse, they take advantage of the general
public’s curiosity and seek to profit from the past indiscretions of
arrestees. In many cases, these arrestees have served or are serving their
court-ordered punishment. In other instances the arrestees have been
acquitted. In any event, they have already been judged by the criminal
justice system. As these individuals attempt to move on with their lives,
Mugshot Racket websites do nothing more than throw up roadblocks of
embarrassment, ridicule, and, arguably, extortion.110
The privacy concerns cited by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits when
booking photos are made available to the media are magnified by the
rise of mugshot websites. The visibility of a mugshot that appears on the
first page of a Google search can understandably have a much greater
“stigmatizing effect” on that individual than a mugshot given to a
104. See id. at 831–32.
105. Id. at 827.
106. Id. at 828 (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp.
2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 828–29.
108. Id. at 832 (“[W]hen the public interest is balanced against the privacy interest in a
booking photo, Tulsa World’s request would not further the purpose of the FOIA.”).
109. See Allen Rostron, The Mugshot Industry: Freedom of Speech, Rights of Publicity,
and the Controversy Sparked by an Unusual Type of Business, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1321, 1323
(2013) (noting that Internet mugshot businesses use “screen-scraping programs” to copy
mugshots from police department websites and post the copied mugshots on the businesses’
own websites).
110. See id. at 1324 (noting that mugshot businesses make money from those persons who
are embarrassed enough of their mugshot that they “essentially pay to make them go away”).
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member of the media for one-time publication.111 Arguably, the Sixth
Circuit’s narrow holding does not apply to this context. Detroit Free
Press only considered the privacy interests in booking photos during an
ongoing criminal trial that had already been publicized.112 The court
was careful to note that its analysis would likely be different in
situations involving the publication of mugshots before or after trial or
if a defendant was acquitted.113 All of these scenarios are in some form
present in the mugshot website context and thus support recognizing a
privacy right in a mugshot.
II. PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC RECORD IN FLORIDA
All states have followed FOIA’s lead and passed laws ensuring
varying degrees of openness in matters relating to public business and
records.114 These laws require that the states and state agencies make
this information available to the public.115 Laws pertaining to the
accessibility of state public records are determined by each state.116
Florida provides a unique example.117
A. Florida’s Very Public Record
Florida’s longstanding tradition of guaranteeing free access to
public records can be traced to 1909, when the Florida Legislature
enacted Chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes.118 The current version of
this statute defines public records as “all documents, papers, letters,
111. World Publ’g Co., 673 F.3d at 828 (quoting Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996).
113. See id.
114. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002) (“Today, all fifty states have open records
statutes, a majority of which are modeled after the FOIA.”); see State Sunshine Laws,
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/State_sunshine_laws (last visited May 19, 2014)
(supplying comparisons and descriptions of each state’s public records laws).
115. State Sunshine Laws, supra note 114; see Michele Estrin Gilman, “Charitable
Choice” and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV. 797, 819–20 (2002) (noting that “freedom of
information acts” and sunshine laws make government files and agency meetings available to
the public).
116. See Public Records: Availability of Arrest Records, 1977 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 269,
270, available at 1977 WL 26639, at *2.
117. The legislation differs from state to state in identifying who may request public
records. Florida Statutes § 119.01(1) provides that “all state, county, and municipal records are
open for personal inspection and copying by any person.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01(1) (West,
Westlaw through ch. 272 of 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.).
118. See Open Government – The “Sunshine” Law, OFF. OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF FLA.
PAM
BONDI,
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/DC0B20B7DC22B7418525791B
006A54E4 (last visited May 19, 2014).
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maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data
processing software, or other material, regardless of the physical form,
characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant to
law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official
business by any agency.”119 Today, Florida’s Sunshine Law is codified
in Chapter 286 of the Florida Statutes.120
Any interested party can obtain these records.121 According to the
Florida Constitution, anyone can “inspect or copy any public record
made or received in connection with the official business of any public
body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf,
except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or
specifically made confidential by this Constitution.”122 This section also
states that “[t]he legislature . . . may provide by general law passed by a
two-thirds vote of each house for the exemption of records from the
requirements of subsection (a).”123 Thus, while disclosure is usually
granted pursuant to a public records request, the Constitution permits
exemptions by subsequent legislation.124
The Florida Legislature has chosen to exempt certain law
enforcement records from disclosure if the information is considered
“active.”125 Specifically, Florida law enforcement records that the

119. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(12).
120. Id. § 286.011(1). The statute reads in pertinent part:
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of
any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, including
meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission,
but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be taken are
declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution,
rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at
such meeting. The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all
such meetings.
Id.
121. Cheryl Cooper, Sending the Wrong Message: Technology, Sunshine Law, and the
Public Record in Florida, 39 STETSON L. REV. 411, 420 (2010); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.01(1) (“It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open
for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access to public records is a duty
of each agency.”).
122. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
123. Id. art. I, § 24(c).
124. See Rios v. Direct Mail Express, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(emphasizing that “the Florida Constitution creates a right of access to public records unless the
records in question have been specifically exempted or made confidential”).
125. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.071(2)(c)(1) (stating that “[a]ctive criminal intelligence
information and active criminal investigative information are exempt from . . . s. 24(a), Art. I of
the State Constitution”).
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statute defines as “criminal intelligence information”126 or “criminal
investigative information”127 are exempt from public disclosure if the
records are “active.”128
Certain information included in arrest reports is statutorily excluded
from the definition of criminal intelligence and investigative
information, including the time, date, location, and nature of the
reported crime and arrest; the specific crime charged; and the “name,
sex, age, and address of a person arrested.”129 This information is
considered part of the public record in Florida and is generally
accessible.130 The Attorney General of Florida has stated that the state
does not consider arrest reports to be exempt from public disclosure.131
These records can be obtained without identifying any specific or
legitimate purpose.132 Accordingly, it is quite easy to obtain criminal
records in Florida.
To acquire criminal history reports in Florida, the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) charges the general public a
fee of $24.133 In many cases, however, local Florida law enforcement
agencies do not charge a fee to obtain records for recently arrested
126. Id. § 119.011(3)(a) (defining “criminal intelligence information” as “information with
respect to an identifiable person or group of persons collected by a criminal justice agency in an
effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor possible criminal activity”).
127. Id. § 119.011(3)(b) (defining “criminal investigative information” as “information
with respect to an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a criminal justice agency
in the course of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific act or omission”).
128. Id. § 119.071(2)(c)(1); see State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 1990) (holding
that criminal investigative information is deemed active until conviction); Kight v. Dugger, 574
So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1990) (reiterating the position stated in State v. Kokal that “criminal
investigative information and litigation do not remain active after a conviction and sentence
becomes final on direct appeal”).
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(3)(c)(1)–(4).
130. Public Records Law: Applicability to Crime and Arrest Records, 1980 Fla. Op. Att’y
Gen. 241, 243, available at 1980 WL 350652, at *3 (“[E]ven under the common law, crime and
arrest reports generally were held to be public records subject to public inspection . . . . [N]either
criminal intelligence information nor criminal investigative information includes crime and
arrest reports.”).
131. Id. (“The Public Records Law nowhere expressly exempts or refers to police crime
and arrest reports . . . . [C]riminal intelligence information . . . relates to intelligence information
collected generally in an effort to anticipate criminal activity. . . . [B]ecause [arrest reports]
clearly relate to specific criminal acts or omissions, [they] could not be considered criminal
intelligence information.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. Public Records: Availability of Arrest Records, supra note 116, at 271, 1977 WL
26639, at *3 (“It has been consistently held that Ch. 119, F.S., does not require a citizen to
demonstrate a particular or special interest in a record as a condition to obtaining access to
public documents . . . . [M]ere curiosity or commercial purposes do not vest in either the courts
or the custodian discretion to deny inspection.”).
133. See Obtaining Criminal History Information, FLA. DEP’T L. ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/content/getdoc/2952da22-ba08-4dfc-9e45-2d7932a803ea/ObtainingCriminal-History-Information.aspx (last visited May 19, 2014).
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individuals.134 Under Florida’s broad public access laws, these agencies
publish booking photos and arrest records on their websites and provide
access to the records free of charge.135 Some counties purport to require
personal information such as a name or date of arrest to locate a specific
inmate.136 Leaving the search field blank or entering simple information
such as a date of arrest, however, often produces a list of arrests
complete with identification information, charge, and booking photo.137
Other county law enforcement websites skip this formality and simply
provide access to a list of recent arrestees without requiring a
preliminary search.138 These practices make it very easy for mugshot
websites to copy arrest records and mugshots from law enforcement
websites and to repost the mugshots on their own sites.139 The
unanswered question is whether this new use of public records intrudes
upon the right to privacy in Florida.
B. Privacy in Florida
Analysis of Florida’s right to privacy must begin with a brief look at
federal privacy protection. Interestingly, there is no specifically defined
right to privacy in the United States Constitution.140 Rather, at the
federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that this right can be
found within certain “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights that “create
zones of privacy.”141 Beyond the protection afforded by these
“penumbras,” the Supreme Court has also stated that “the protection of
a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other
people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left
134. See, e.g., Arrest Search, BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFF., http://sheriff.org/apps/arrest (last
visited May 19, 2014) (allowing visitors to search for inmates currently incarcerated in the
Broward Sherriff’s Office jail by name and for no charge); see also John Dorschner, Mugshots:
The Hot New Internet Business, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/11/03/3081517/mugshots-the-hot-new-internet.html.
135. See Dorschner, supra notes 114–20.
136. See, e.g., Arrest Search, supra note 134; Arrest Inquiry, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFF., http://www.hcso.tampa.fl.us/PublicInquiry/ArrestInquiry (last visited May 19,
2014) (allowing visitors to search for arrests in Hillsborough County by date alone).
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
138. Alachua County posts a list of recent arrest records on its website without requiring an
interested party to search for a specific inmate. See Alachua County Jail Inmate Lookup, EIGHTH
JUD. CIRCUIT, http://oldweb.circuit8.org/inmate.html (last visited May 19, 2014) (click “List of
All Inmates”). Brevard County also follows this practice. See Inmate Population, BREVARD
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., http://www.brevardsheriff.com/dar/inmatephotos (last visited May 19,
2014).
139. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
140. Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida in the Age
of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protection from Private and
Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 32 (1997).
141. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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largely to the law of the individual States.”142 Thus, the states may
freely provide more substantial and comprehensive privacy rights than
federal law affords.143 Florida has chosen to establish a right to privacy
that “embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to
the individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution.”144
Florida first recognized a constitutionally protected right to privacy
in November 1980 when citizens throughout the state voted to approve
a privacy amendment proposed that year by the Constitution Revision
Commission.145 Before the provision was ratified, claims that the state
had invaded a citizen’s right of privacy were based upon theories such
as infringement upon the claimant’s “right to be let alone.”146 This right
was first articulated in an article written by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis Brandeis in 1890147 and was later argued by then-Justice Brandeis
in his famous dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.148
The provision incorporated this “right to be let alone” into the
142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
143. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (“While the federal Constitution
traditionally shields enumerated and implied individual liberties from encroachment by state or
federal government, the federal Court has long held that state constitutions may provide even
greater protection.”).
144. Id. at 1192.
145. Overton & Giddings, supra note 140, at 26, 34–35; see also Winfield v. Div. of PariMutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
146. See, e.g., State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1969) (upholding a Florida statute
requiring motorcyclists to wear protective head gear when the claimants argued that it
“unconstitutionally infringed [their] right to be let alone”).
147. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890). As articulated by Professor Warren and Justice Brandeis:
[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing
publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right
of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten,
the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the
right not to be defamed.
Id.
148. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
Id.
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Florida Constitution as an amendment codified in article I, section 23.149
The amendment states that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed
to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law.”150
1. The Florida Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Article I,
Section 23
The Florida Supreme Court has had many opportunities to define
the scope of Florida’s “right to be let alone” since 1980. For example, in
Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant,151 the Florida Supreme
Court addressed whether a requirement that a Florida Bar applicant
disclose certain medical information “relevant to [his] good moral
character and fitness to perform the responsibilities of an attorney”
constituted a violation of the applicant’s right of privacy under the
Florida Constitution.152 In answering this question, the court stated that
when considering an alleged violation of Florida’s right to privacy, the
“privacy right . . . must be considered in the context in which it is
asserted and may not be considered wholly independent of those
circumstances.”153 Although the Florida Supreme Court had not yet
established a standard of review for intrusions upon Florida’s right to
privacy when this case was decided, it found the state’s interest in
requiring the disclosures to be compelling “since mental fitness and
emotional stability are essential to the ability to practice law in a
manner not injurious to the public.”154 Thus, whether an alleged
intrusion upon a citizen’s privacy actually constitutes a violation of the
Florida Constitution depends in large part on the circumstances.
The Florida Supreme Court promulgated a standard of review for
constitutional challenges to the privacy amendment in 1985 in Winfield
v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.155 In Winfield, the Department of
Business Regulation subpoenaed certain banking records and requested
that the banks providing the information not notify the petitioners that
their records had been disclosed.156 Noting that the drafters of article I,
section 23 had intentionally omitted certain limiting words from the
final version of the amendment, the court determined that the
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

FLA. CONST. art I, § 23.
Id.
443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 74.
See id. at 74–75.
See 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
Id. at 546.
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amendment was intended to be “much broader in scope than that of the
Federal Constitution.”157 Accordingly, the court stated that the state
could infringe a citizen’s right to privacy by “demonstrating that the
challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and
accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”158 In
other words, the Florida Supreme Court applies a strict scrutiny-like test
to invasions upon the right to privacy.159
Employing this standard, the Florida Supreme Court has declared
many state intrusions upon Florida’s right to privacy to be
constitutional. While many of the following cases do not deal directly
with privacy rights associated with criminal records or mugshots, they
are instructive to understanding the contours of Florida’s right to
privacy. For example, the Florida Supreme Court has held that the state
has a compelling interest justifying otherwise impermissible intrusions
in criminal investigations if the state “demonstrates a clear connection
between the illegal activity and the person whose privacy would be
invaded.”160 The court has further held that the state has a compelling
interest in preventing the distribution of “obscene” materials even
though one can legally possess these materials in their home161 and that
defendants cannot claim a violation of their privacy right when they are
prosecuted for such actions.162 The court has also held that government
entities can pass regulations requiring the disclosure of private aspects
of an individual’s life when the entity has demonstrated a significant
financial interest in obtaining the disclosure.163 Finally, the Florida
Supreme Court has declared that Florida’s right to privacy protects an
incompetent, terminally ill patient’s right to provide in a testamentary

157. Id. at 548.
158. Id. at 547.
159. See N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 886 So. 2d 612, 626
(Fla. 2002) (noting that Florida’s right of privacy warrants strict scrutiny review because it is a
fundamental right).
160. See Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1989) (upholding the placement of
pen registers on certain telephone lines when the state can “show a reasonable founded
suspicion that the targeted telephone line was being used for a criminal purpose” (footnote
omitted)).
161. See Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 1990) (“The right to possess privately
does not equate to the right to sell publicly . . . . There is no indication that the drafters of article
I, section 23 meant to broaden the right of privacy as it relates to obscene materials . . . .”).
162. Id. at 262–63.
163. See City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027–29 (Fla. 1995) (holding that the
City of North Miami could require job applicants to disclose their smoking habits for the twelve
months immediately preceding applying to work for the city because the city demonstrated that
those who abstain from smoking for one year are much less likely to resume smoking, and
medical expenses incurred by nonsmoking employees was significantly lower than those for
employees that smoked).
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document for the termination of artificial life-sustaining treatment.164
Interpreting the supreme court’s ruling on an individual’s right to
end life-sustaining treatment, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal
held that this right existed even when not stated in a testamentary
document.165 Additionally, the court found that in situations where
surviving family members cannot agree on whether treatment should be
terminated for an incompetent loved one who has not articulated her
wishes, it is not a violation of the patient’s right to privacy for Florida
courts to decide the matter.166
On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court has also found certain
intrusions upon Florida’s right to privacy to be unconstitutional. For
example, in Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc.,167 the court
found that the privacy interests of blood donors outweighed a plaintiff’s
subpoena duces tecum requesting documents in the possession of the
blood service that contained information identifying its blood donors.168
The plaintiff’s estate requested the documents in an attempt to
determine whether any of the donors from whom the plaintiff received a
blood transfusion had been infected with autoimmune deficiency virus
(AIDS), which had caused the plaintiff’s death.169 The court denied the
request because the subpoena duces tecum did not limit the use of the
information once it had been disclosed and because the “[d]isclosure of
donor identities in any context involving AIDS could be extremely
disruptive and even devastating to the individual donor,” which could
result in fewer people deciding to donate blood.170 Thus, the supreme
court recognized that article I, section 23 “was intended to protect the
right to determine whether or not sensitive information about oneself
will be disclosed to others.”171
Furthermore, in In re T.W.,172 the Florida Supreme Court concluded
that Florida’s privacy amendment protected a woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy173 and that this right also applied to unwed
164. See John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923–24, 926
(Fla. 1984).
165. See Corbett v. D’Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370–72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
166. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814, 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that “[i]n circumstances such as these, when families cannot agree, the law has opened
the doors of the circuit courts to permit trial judges to serve as surrogates or proxies to make
decisions about life prolonging procedures”).
167. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
168. Id. at 534.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 537–38.
171. Id. at 536.
172. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
173. Id. at 1192 (“We can conceive of few more personal or private decisions concerning
one’s body that one can make in the course of a lifetime . . . .”).
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minors.174 Specifically, the court stated that Florida’s interest in
restricting a woman’s right to choose is not a compelling state interest
until the fetus becomes viable, or “when the fetus becomes capable of
meaningful life outside the womb through standard medical
measures.”175
2. Article I, Section 23 and Access to Public Records
Despite the strict scrutiny standard,176 the importance of determining
the context in which the alleged intrusion has occurred,177 and the fact
that the amendment provides a safeguard against unwanted public
disclosures of sensitive information,178 it might appear that republishing
mugshots on private websites in the manner previously described does
not violate article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.179 The
second sentence of article I, section 23 explicitly states that it “shall not
be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law.”180 To those perpetrating the Mugshot
Racket, an individual’s privacy rights are not infringed when their arrest
records are republished on the Internet, as this information is freely
available under the state’s public records laws concerning criminal
records.181 In short, one could argue that the protection that the Florida
Constitution provides to a “person’s private life” does not extend to
information available to the public under state law. Although the Florida
Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to weigh in on the merits
of this argument, it has in the past resolved conflicts arising from
Florida’s dual commitment to open government and the right to privacy.
The following cases can be instructive in predicting how the supreme
court would rule if presented with the issue. These conflicts arose in
cases dealing with the sealing of court records, private information
contained in discoverable materials, and the release of crime scene and
autopsy photos and videos.
In Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc.,182 which
considered whether to seal the record in a divorce proceeding, the
Florida Supreme Court established a six-part test for sealing “court
174. Id. at 1193 (“The next question to be addressed is whether this freedom of choice
concerning abortion extends to minors. We conclude that it does, based on the unambiguous
language of the amendment: The right of privacy extends to ‘[e]very natural person.’”
(alteration in original)).
175. Id. at 1193–94.
176. See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
180. FLA. CONST. art I, § 23.
181. See supra notes 119–32 and accompanying text.
182. 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988).
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proceedings and records.”183 After noting that “[p]ublic trials are
essential to the judicial system’s credibility in a free society,”184 the
court found that in certain situations, Florida’s privacy amendment
provided a “constitutional basis for closure.”185 Closure is appropriate
when motions to seal a record are “necessary . . . (e) to avoid substantial
injury to innocent third parties . . . or (f) to avoid substantial injury to a
party by disclosure of matters protected by a common law or privacy
right not generally inherent in the specific type of civil proceeding
sought to be closed.”186 The court also held that, before sealing a record,
a court must conclude that there are no reasonable alternatives to
closure and that the court must use “the least restrictive closure
necessary to accomplish its purpose.”187 The supreme court ultimately
held that the petitioner’s request for sealing the records in this case did
not satisfy this standard.188
Using the Barron test, the Florida Supreme Court later declined to
extend Florida’s right to privacy “to protect the names and addresses
contained in public records”189 which had become part of the public
record according to state discovery procedures.190 In Post-Newsweek
Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe, many “John Does” filed a motion to
prevent discovery materials from being released to the public.191 The
materials at issue were seized during the search of a home involved in a
prostitution ring and contained the “names and addresses, and other lists
stating the names, amounts paid, and sexual notations regarding [the
defendant’s] customers.”192 The customers identified in these items
were the “John Does” who challenged release of the records.193 The
court limited its ruling to the names and addresses of the individuals
listed in the seized materials and stopped short of holding that the right
to privacy could not be invoked if the materials contained more
sensitive information.194 The decision to allow the release was also
183. Id. at 118.
184. Id. at 116.
185. Id. at 118. The court also noted that “it is generally the content of the subject matter
rather than the status of the party that determines whether a privacy interest exists and closure
should be permitted.” Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 119.
189. See Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla. Inc. v. Doe, 612 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1992).
190. Under Florida law, pretrial discovery material becomes a public record once the
prosecutor hands it over to the defendant in a criminal case. See Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc.
v. McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1988).
191. Post-Newsweek Stations, 612 So. 2d at 550.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 552; id. at 552 n.3 (“Because the trial court has not conducted an in-camera
review of any information other than the names and addresses and because the trial court has not
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based in part upon the fact that the “John Does” had willingly
participated in the prostitution ring.195
Perhaps the most intriguing clashes between the right to privacy and
the right to access public records in Florida have involved the public’s
desire to view highly sensitive crime scene and autopsy photographs or
videos. Interestingly, Florida courts have consistently applied Florida’s
privacy right to block public release of these types of records.
Florida’s Eighth Judicial Circuit Court in Alachua County addressed
this issue in one of the state’s most famous murder cases, State v.
Rolling.196 In Rolling, the State Attorney, acting on behalf of the
families of victims murdered by serial killer Danny Rolling, petitioned
the court to prevent the public disclosure of crime scene and autopsy
pictures and videotapes that had been created during the course of the
investigation.197 These materials were public records because they had
been “taken by officers of the State in the course of the investigation,”
and because they were made available to the defense during pretrial
discovery.198 The pictures and videotapes were highly disturbing and
depicted the “nude and mutilated bodies of [Rolling’s] victims.”199 The
families argued that public release of these documents would cause
them future distress and injury in violation of their right to privacy.200
Citing Post-Newsweek Stations and utilizing the Barron test, the
court concluded that the relatives of the deceased victims had a
constitutionally protected privacy right that would be violated if the
photos were released, although this right was less weighty than that
which the victims would possess if they had survived.201 The court
balanced “the public’s right to know against the residual privacy interest
of the victim’s relatives,”202 and came up with a unique solution to
ruled on the disclosure of any other information, we do not address whether that information
should be released. However, we note that the details of an individual’s life dealing with
noncriminal intimate associations fall within a protected zone of privacy.”).
195. Id. at 552–53 (“Because the Does’ privacy rights are not implicated when they
participate in a crime, we find that closure is not justified under Barron.”).
196. No. 91-3832 CF A, 1994 WL 722891 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1994).
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id. at *2.
199. See id. at *3.
200. Id. at *1.
201. See id. at *5 (“The right is less weighty, however, than would be the right to privacy
held by the victims themselves, and is further attenuated by the distance of the relatives from the
victims and from the event itself.”).
202. Id. The court noted that the public’s right to access the information must be balanced
against the intrusion on the families’ fundamental right to privacy. Id. Specifically, the court
balanced four factors:
a. The relevance of disclosure of the material to furthering public evaluation of
governmental accountability;
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further both interests. The court permitted members of the public to
view the photos and videos in the office of the records custodian but
prohibited the public from copying or removing them.203
In Earnhardt v. Volusia County,204 the Florida Circuit Court for the
Seventh Judicial Circuit addressed a similar issue concerning the release
of autopsy photos of famous racecar driver Dale Earnhardt.205 On
February 22, 2001, three days after her husband died in a crash at the
Daytona International Speedway, Teresa Earnhardt obtained a
temporary injunction preventing the release of autopsy photos taken by
the Volusia County Medical Examiner during the investigation of Mr.
Earnhardt’s death.206 On February 23, the Orlando Sentinel requested
the autopsy records, and the medical examiner who prepared the
autopsy records denied the request.207 Thereafter, members of the
media, including the Orlando Sentinel and a website owner that had
published autopsy photos of other deceased racecar drivers, challenged
the injunction.208 Considering the graphic nature of the photographs and
the fact that they would be disseminated worldwide over the Internet if
released, the court upheld the injunction and stated that “[a]utopsy
photographs are different in character than other documents retained by
the government and, in spite of the sophisticated arguments in favor of
their open release, they are the ‘business’ of very few people.”209 In
support of its ruling, the court noted that the photographs did not
provide any information that was not already available in the publicly
available autopsy report.210 Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal
upheld the circuit court’s holding in Campus Communications, Inc. v.
b. The seriousness of the intrusion into the close relatives’ right to privacy by
disclosure of the material;
c. The availability, from other sources . . . of material which is equally relevant
to the evaluation of the same governmental action but is less intrusive on the
right to privacy;
d. The availability of alternatives other than full disclosure which might serve
to protect both the interests of the public and the interest of the victims.
Id.
203. Id. at *6 (“This remedy permits the public and media to independently evaluate what
the jurors saw, close-up as they saw it, and to reach whatever independent conclusion they deem
proper. It permits interested members of the public and the media access to the material
sufficient to enable them to carry out the oversight function envisioned by Florida’s Public
Records Act.”).
204. No. 2001-30373-CICI, 2001 WL 992068 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2001).
205. Id. at *3.
206. Id. at *1–2.
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *2–5.
210. Id. at *4.
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Earnhardt.211 The Fifth District Court of Appeal also upheld the
constitutionality of a statute passed during the litigation, which,
pursuant to article I, section 24, specifically and retroactively barred the
release of autopsy photographs, videos, and audio to the general public
without a court order.212
Most recently, Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit Court in Orange
County considered whether to release photos and video footage of
SeaWorld trainer Dawn Brancheau’s death.213 Mrs. Brancheau was
killed after being pulled into the water by an orca during a live
performance on February 24, 2010.214 SeaWorld’s cameras captured
videos of the events occurring after the victim was pulled into the pool,
and SeaWorld made the footage available to the Orange County
Sheriff’s Office.215 Members of Mrs. Brancheau’s family successfully
obtained an injunction preventing the release of this video and other
death scene photos and videos generated during the investigation.216
Disclosure of materials created during the autopsy was not at issue in
the case.217
Citing Post-Newsweek, Barron, Earnhardt, and Rolling, and noting
that there was no ongoing criminal investigation in the case, the court
held that the privacy concerns of the Brancheau family outweighed any
interest the public might have in viewing the materials.218 The court
took special note of the disturbing and graphic content of the photos and
videos, that they would be widely dispersed over the Internet, and that
both the medical examiner and the sheriff’s office had produced reports
that provided “less intrusive means to evaluate government performance

211. See 821 So. 2d 388, 391, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“[W]hile our constitution
does not catalogue every matter that one can hold as private, autopsy photographs which display
the remains of a deceased human being is certainly one of them.”). The court utilized the same
four-part balancing test first articulated by the circuit court in State v. Rolling. Compare id. at
401, with supra note 202. The Florida Legislature later codified this test. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 406.135(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.).
212. See Campus Commc’ns, 821 So. 2d at 392, 401, 402–03 (upholding FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 406.135(3), which gives permission to obtain records of photographs, video, and audio of
autopsies only to the agent of a relative and a local government agency and disallows the
custodian of record from permitting any other person from obtaining autopsy records without
permission from the decedent’s relative). See generally supra notes 123–24 and accompanying
text (discussing how the legislature may create such exceptions).
213. Brancheau v. Demings, No. 2010-CA-6673, 2010 WL 7971871, at 2–3, 10 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 15, 2010) (order granting permanent injunction).
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id. at 6.
216. Id. at 2–3.
217. See id. at 2, 6 (noting that SeaWorld’s videos depicting Mrs. Brancheau’s death and
the subsequent attempts to rescue and recover her body were at issue).
218. Id. at 10, 13, 14.
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in this case.”219
These decisions clearly demonstrate Florida’s recognition that there
are privacy interests inherent in certain sensitive public records that may
outweigh the public’s right to view them. The open question is whether
this newly acknowledged privacy interest in autopsy and graphic crime
scene photographs extends to other public records such as mugshots.
3. How Florida Courts Might Apply Article I,
Section 23 to Mugshots
As the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have made clear, one has a strong privacy interest in
their mugshot.220 Florida courts have not yet addressed this issue
directly, but their decisions in cases involving public records other than
autopsy and crime scene photos suggest that a Florida court is unlikely
to extend Florida’s right to privacy to mugshots.
For example, in Woodard v. Sunbeam Television Corp.,221 a school
bus driver in Dade County, Florida sued a reporter for publishing a story
detailing the bus driver’s past criminal history.222 The report was based
on information received from the Florida Attorney General’s Office and
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The report
erroneously stated that the driver had been incarcerated for four years
after being convicted for murder under a different name.223 In truth, the
driver had been convicted of attempted murder and served two years of
a four-year sentence.224 Even though the report was incorrect, the court
noted that the press had a right to print “information they receive from
government officials.”225 Additionally, the court stated that the reporter
“had no duty to determine the accuracy of the information contained in
the FDLE records before broadcasting it in his report.”226 The Third
District Court of Appeal (DCA) upheld a summary judgment motion
granted by the lower court in favor of Sunbeam.227
219. Id. at 14 (“[A]pplying the standards pronounced in Barron and Doe, and since used in
Rolling, this Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s privacy interests outweigh any
legitimate interest of the public in access to the Death Scene Photographs and Death Scene
Videos at issue in this case.”).
220. See supra Section I.C.
221. 616 So. 2d 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
222. Id. at 502.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting Ortega v. Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 510 So. 2d 972, 976 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that this right is honored even if
the information gleaned from the government reports is incorrect as long as the reporting is
“reasonable, accurate and fair”).
226. Id. at 503.
227. Id.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/8

32

Polatsek: Extortion Through the Public Record: Has the Internet Made Florid

2014]

EXTORTION THROUGH THE PUBLIC RECORD

945

Additionally, in Walker v. Florida Department of Law
Enforcement,228 the Third DCA affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of
a much stronger claim for invasion of privacy in favor of Florida’s
public records laws.229 There, a teacher sued FDLE for releasing records
containing information about the teacher’s prior criminal history.230
These documents had been previously sealed and expunged by court
order.231 The court held that the teacher “could not state a cause of
action for invasion of privacy, as a matter of law, because the
information allegedly disseminated by FDLE constituted a matter of
legitimate public interest or concern.”232
The treatment of these cases by Florida courts suggests that as
public records made available by government officials, mugshots can
fairly be republished even if the mugshots contain inaccurate
information. Walker also clearly states that the right to privacy protected
in article I, section 23 does not extend to public records that are of
“legitimate public interest or concern,”233 which may well include
mugshots.
In short, these cases demonstrate the state’s strong commitment to
maintaining openness and transparency in government dealings and
matters of public interest. These sentiments are eagerly echoed by those
operating the Mugshot Racket, who also claim they are honoring the
state’s dedication to openness by reposting booking photos and arrest
information.234 In Woodard and Walker, however, the agencies
disseminating the information had a legitimate interest for disclosure, an
interest that furthered Florida’s commitment to open records.235 In
contrast, despite their claims, the actions and motives of those
perpetrating the Mugshot Racket do not appear to be so altruistic.236
Whether this fact resonates with Florida courts such that they would
consider the republication of mugshots on private websites to be an
invasion of privacy remains to be seen.

228. 845 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
229. See id. at 340.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989)).
234. See Silverman, supra note 6.
235. See Walker, 845 So. 2d at 340; Woodard v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 616 So. 2d
501, 502–03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Ortega v. Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 510 So.
2d 972, 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 22–35 and accompanying text; cf. Holland, supra note 15, at 240
(“However well-intentioned the Florida legislature was in making mugshots part of the public
record, the extortion [by mugshot websites] of those arrested is clearly not a desired outcome.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8

946

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

III. EXTORTION THROUGH THE PUBLIC RECORD
The most important question surrounding the Mugshot Racket is
whether republishing legally obtained arrest information on privately
owned websites and charging for its removal is illegal. As the name
implies, some consider the mugshot websites’ actions to be a form of
extortion.237 They certainly seem to be at first glance. Bringing a
successful extortion action against the owners of mugshot websites may
be difficult, however, given Florida courts’ conflicting interpretations of
Florida’s extortion statute.
A strong negative reaction to the Mugshot Racket business is hardly
surprising among those whose records have been re-posted on these
websites, given the nature of the practice and the stigma generally
associated with mugshots.238 The circumstances under which many of
the images are depicted are highly prejudicial, regardless of the nature
of the crime.239 Mugshots often remain accessible on the websites even
after the defendant has been acquitted or the authorities have reduced
the underlying charge.240 Moreover, there is often no way to remove the
images other than by paying a fee to collusive websites, and even this
does not guarantee that the information will not be republished on a
similar website in the future.241 Indeed, “[t]he business model seems to
be to generate embarrassment and then remove the source of the
embarrassment for a fee . . . the whole practice is designed to exploit
human weakness.”242
According to Florida’s extortion statute:
Whoever either verbally or by written or printed
communication . . . maliciously threatens an injury to
the . . . reputation of another, or maliciously threatens to
expose another to disgrace . . . with intent thereby to extort
money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with
intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other
person, to do any act . . . shall be guilty of a felony of the
237. See Dorschner, supra note 134; Holland, supra note 15, at 240.
238. See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A]
booking photograph is a vivid symbol of criminal accusation, which, when released to the
public, intimates, and is often equated with, guilt.”).
239. See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. George, 160 F.
App’x 450, 456 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that mugshots can be unfairly prejudicial because of
their tendency to evoke negative associations, i.e., “make people believe the [person pictured in
the mugshot] is ‘bad’”).
240. See Green, supra note 12.
241. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
242. See Kravets, supra note 12 (quoting Steven Aftergood, the director of the Project on
Government Secrecy for the Federation of American Scientists) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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second degree . . . .243
The party bringing the extortion action must prove that the threat was
undertaken with malice.244 Moreover, “[t]here is no requirement . . . that
the extortionist intend (or even have the ability) to carry out his
threat.”245
The language of this statute seems to confirm that the Mugshot
Racket is aptly named. Disseminating arrest information much more
broadly (and much less ethically) than law enforcement websites and
subsequently charging for removal appears to constitute a malicious
threat to damage the reputation of those depicted. Such dissemination
could also be considered a malicious threat to hinder employment
opportunities and to cause psychological trauma and embarrassment.246
Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has held that one cannot
threaten to perform even a lawful act to gain a monetary advantage.247
Given the Florida Supreme Court’s refusal to “sanction the use of
243. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.05 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of
the 23rd Legis.).
244. See Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1980) (noting that the extortion
statute prohibits utterances or communications that “constitute malicious threats to do injury to
another’s person, reputation, or property” and that the defendant’s argument failed to “recognize
the additional elements of malice and intent required to convict under the [extortion] statute”).
Two different definitions of malice exist. Each represents a separate standard that must be met
to satisfy the elements of an extortion charge, and there is disagreement among the Florida
District Courts of Appeal as to which standard applies in an extortion case. In Dudley v. State,
the court used the definition for “legal malice,” and stated that “[a] threat is malicious if it is
made intentionally and without any lawful justification.” 634 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Alonso v. State, 447 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); see also
Calamia v. State, 125 So. 3d 1007, 1009–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Chestnut v. State, 516
So. 2d 1144, 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a malicious threat must be shown for
a charge of extortion under Florida’s extortion statute). The second definition, “actual malice,”
is defined as “ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent.” Id. at 1010 (quoting State v. Gaylord, 356 So.
2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Calamia, Florida’s Fifth DCA
held that “actual malice” was the proper definition to utilize in an extortion proceeding. Id. The
conflict between the Second and Fifth DCAs has been certified to the Florida Supreme Court for
resolution. Id. at 1012.
245. Alonso, 447 So. 2d at 1030.
246. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text; see also Duan v. State, 970 So. 2d
903, 906–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that Florida’s extortion statute “does encompass
injuries . . . where the [extorter] threatened the victim and caused her emotional distress”). The
court in Duan noted that whether the Florida extortion statute extends to mental or emotional
injury was an issue of first impression in Florida. Id. at 907. The court specifically referenced
Florida’s extortion statute and noted that the statute’s express prohibition of “threats to divulge
information which would damage the victim’s reputation, or which would expose the victim to
disgrace” evidences legislative intent to include mental or emotional well-being as the types of
harms recognized under the Florida extortion statute. Id.
247. Carricarte, 384 So. 2d at 1263 (stating that “we cannot sanction the use of threats to
take legal action where those threats are made maliciously and with the intent to acquire
pecuniary gain”); accord Duan, 970 So. 2d at 906.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8

948

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

threats to take legal action where those threats are made maliciously
and with the intent to acquire pecuniary gain,”248 the argument that the
mugshot websites simply republish information in the public record is
less persuasive.249
As reprehensible as their actions appear, the mugshot websites may
not actually be guilty of extortion under Florida law.250 Moreover,
Florida’s extortion law is a criminal statute,251 and whether and to what
extent it provides for a private right of action has been treated
differently by various courts in Florida.252 For example, in Bass v.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, the Third DCA held that there is no civil
cause of action under Florida Statutes § 836.05.253 The court cited an
earlier decision holding that under Florida law, a “mere violation of the
penal statutes does not give rise to liability per se” when the section was
not intended by the legislature to protect a particular class.254 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has
similarly held that “there is no private right of action under
§ 836.05.”255
Moreover, if a party were to bring a private cause of action for
extortion, that party must prove that the photos were republished with
malice.256 While there is a decent argument that this activity constitutes
a malicious threat, it may still not convince a court.257 For example, the
Florida Supreme Court has held that “in order for a demand and threat
to be actionable under our extortion statute, it must be calculated to
coerce the victim’s acquiescence ‘in order to prevent the threat from
being carried out.’”258 Here, reposting mugshot photos is arguably itself
248. Carricarte, 384 So. 2d at 1263 (emphasis added).
249. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text; see also Duan, 970 So. 2d at 906
(“[G]enerally[,] a claim of extortion cannot be predicated on a threat to do an act which a person
has a lawful right to do, one may not threaten to undertake an otherwise legal act to his own
pecuniary advantage.” (emphasis added)).
250. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Ferre, 636 F. Supp. 970, 976 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (stating
that there “is persuasive authority for the proposition that in enacting § 836.05 the Florida
Legislature did not intend to create a private civil cause of action”).
251. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.05 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.
of the 23rd Legis.); accord Kamau v. Slate, No. 4:11cv522-RH/CAS, 2012 WL 5390001, at *10
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2012) (“As correctly noted by Defendants, § 836.05 is a criminal
statute . . . .”).
252. See, e.g., Bass v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 516 So. 2d 1011, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 636 F. Supp. at 976.
253. Bass, 516 So. 2d at 1011; accord Kamau, 2012 WL 5390001, at *10.
254. Bass, 516 So. 2d at 1011 (quoting Lavis Plumbing Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 515 So. 2d
296, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
255. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 636 F. Supp. at 977.
256. See supra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
257. See Green, supra note 12; see also Tanner, supra note 14.
258. Matthews v. State, 363 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 1978) (quoting State v. McInnes, 153
So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)).
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an action and not a malicious threat to perform an action in the future.
In other words, the mugshot websites are not really making a malicious
threat to anyone before they repost the photos—they are simply posting
them. It remains unclear whether a court would conclude that the act of
reposting a mugshot itself constitutes a malicious threat.
Absent clear precedent, potential plaintiffs must weigh the
competing arguments based on the facts. There is a strong, fact-based
argument that reposting mugshot photos satisfies the “malicious threat”
element of the Florida extortion statute.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines malice as: “1. The intent, without
justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. 2. Reckless disregard
of the law or of a person’s legal rights. 3. Ill will; wickedness of
heart.”259 The stark contrast between the manner in which law
enforcement websites post booking photos and the way the photos are
often depicted on the mugshot websites suggests that there is a
malicious intent behind the photos’ reposting.260 If the true motivating
factor behind the Mugshot Racket was to provide a public service and
further disseminate arrest records found in the public record, as the
website owners argue, these websites would not need to depict the
information in highly pejorative and slanderous ways.261 The websites
would simply repost the photos in a professional, nonderogatory
manner, similar to the way they are featured on law enforcement
websites.262
The “threat” portion of the malicious threat element can be found in
the potential negative impact upon the reputation and employment
opportunities of an arrestee as well as the emotional harm that can result
from finding one’s booking photo on a mugshot website.263 This
information is only a click away on a variety of search engines and is
available to peers, friends, and employers, with no explanation of the
circumstances leading to the arrest or the ultimate disposition of the
case.264 In this regard, these actions may indeed constitute a threat.265
This argument is consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Florida’s extortion law: “The extortion statute prohibits
only those utterances or communications which constitute malicious
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1042 (9th ed. 2009).
See supra notes 12–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3–11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 243–49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 2382 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S] (defining a
threat as an “expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means and
esp[ecially] by means involving coercion or duress of the person threatened” or “something that
by its very nature or relation to another threatens the welfare of the latter”).
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threats to do injury to another’s person, reputation, or property.
Furthermore, the threats must be made with the intent to extort money
or the intent to compel another to act or refrain from acting against his
will.”266
While the malicious threat requirement may be the greatest obstacle
that opponents of the Mugshot Racket face, it may not be the only
hurdle. Even if it is determined that the websites are committing
extortion by charging for removal, that may be the only illegal act in
which they are engaged. The fact that arrest records are part of the
public record and are freely accessible under Florida law267 suggests
that the mugshot websites are not breaking any laws by copying and
republishing the records.268 If courts accept the website owners’
argument that they simply disseminate publicly accessible information,
then the manner in which they depict these pictures, while unethical,
may be perfectly legal.269 Therefore, much depends on if the mugshot
website’s practices are determined to be illegal or simply immoral. In
the meantime, it is unclear whether mugshot websites engage in an
actionable form of extortion under Florida law. An alternate method of
prosecution is worth exploring.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Another promising approach to deterring perpetrators of the
Mugshot Racket that seems promising can be found in the Florida RICO
Act. It bears mentioning that while this approach avoids some of the
issues presented when pursing a direct extortion claim, a plaintiff still
must prove the malicious threat element under Florida’s extortion
statute to succeed with a Florida RICO cause of action.270
A. Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
The Florida RICO Act is a very broad law, encompassing many
crimes and prescribing serious punishments for infractions.271 The law
was passed in 1977 amid “a political atmosphere that forced lawmakers
266. Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1980).
267. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(12) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the 2013 Reg.
Sess. of the 23rd Legis.); SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 129–30.
268. See Green, supra note 12 (implying that the mugshot removal business model is
wrong but not criminal); Kravets, supra note 12 (same); Silverman, supra note 6 (same).
269. See Green, supra note 12; see also Tanner, supra note 14.
270. See Nicor Int’l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(noting that crimes covered by the Florida RICO Act include “extortion under Section 836.05 of
the Florida Statutes”); supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
271. Jacqueline Dowd, Interpreting RICO: In Florida, the Rules Are Different, 40 FLA. L.
REV. 127, 128 (1988) (“While the federal statute is sweeping, Florida’s version is even broader,
incorporating far more crimes and providing more severe penalties.” (footnote omitted)).
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to promise to be tough on crime.”272 As a consequence, the statutory
definition of “‘racketeering activity’ . . . includes far more crimes than
the Florida Legislature intended.”273 Florida’s RICO Act even includes
crimes defined as “racketeering activity” under federal law.274
The appeal of attempting to establish a cause of action against
mugshot websites under the Florida RICO Act is that a Florida RICO
action avoids some of the pitfalls of Florida’s extortion statute; namely,
unlike Florida’s extortion law,275 there is a recognized civil cause of
action under the Florida RICO Act.276 Section 895.05(6) of the Florida
RICO Act states, in pertinent part, that:
Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding under
subsection (1). In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in
conformity with the principles that govern the granting of
injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other
civil cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable
damage to the person shall have to be made.277
Section 895.05(1) of the statute provides that “[a]ny circuit court
may . . . enjoin violations of the provisions of s. 895.03 by issuing
appropriate orders and judgments,”278 which include “[i]mposing
reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any
defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which the

272. Id. at 130.
273. Id. at 132; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the
2013 Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.) (listing fifty separate crimes under Florida law that are
included in the definition of “racketeering activity”).
274. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(1)(b) (extending Florida’s definition of “racketeering
activity” under § 895.02(1)(a) to include “[a]ny conduct defined as ‘racketeering activity’ under
18 U.S.C. s. 1961(1)”). See generally BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE
691 (3d ed. 2009) (stating that, in common usage, “racketeering refers to the business of
racketeers—a system of organized crime traditionally involving the extortion of money from
business firms by intimidation, violence, or other illegal methods. . . . Today racketeering often
has the broad sense ‘the practice of engaging in a fraudulent scheme or enterprise.’”);
WEBSTER’S, supra note 265, at 1871 (defining a “racket” as both an “illegitimate enterprise or
activity that is made workable by coercion, bribery, or intimidation,” and “a system of obtaining
money or other advantage illegally, fraudulently, or undeservedly [usually] with the outward
consent of the victims”); id. (defining “racketeer” as “one who extorts money or
advantages . . . by threatened or unlawful interference with business or employment: one who
engages in a racket”).
275. See supra notes 250–55 and accompanying text.
276. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05; see also 16C FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1983 (“The
Florida RICO Act provides for civil remedies which includes injunctive relief and forfeiture of
property.” (footnotes omitted)).
277. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(6).
278. Id. § 895.05(1).
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defendant was engaged in violation of the provisions of s. 895.03.”279
In § 895.03(1), the Florida RICO Act provides:
It is unlawful for any person who has with criminal intent
received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a
pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, whether
directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds . . . in the
establishment or operation of any enterprise.280
The statute defines “racketeering activity” broadly.281 “Racketeering
activity” is defined in § 895.02(a)(1)(40) to include “[s]ection 836.05,
relating to extortion.”282 “Racketeering activity” is also defined in
section 895.02(b) to include conduct defined as “racketeering activity”
under federal law.283
The relevant portions of Florida’s extortion statute have already
been described.284 Under federal law, conduct defined as “racketeering
activity” includes “any act or threat involving . . . extortion . . . which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year.”285 Under Florida’s extortion statute, guilty parties are
charged with a second-degree felony,286 which is punishable by a
maximum prison sentence of fifteen years.287 Whereas the Florida
extortion statute does not provide aggrieved parties a civil remedy for
extortion,288 the Florida RICO Act may provide aggrieved parties a civil
remedy for extortion repackaged as “racketeering activity.289 Thus, the
Florida RICO Act cause of action circumvents the argument that there is
no civil remedy for extortion in Florida.
While the Florida RICO Act approach permits a civil remedy, the
party pursuing this cause of action will still need to establish that reposting booking photos constitutes a malicious threat under section
836.05.290 As stated above, a strong, fact-based argument supports this
279. Id. § 895.05(1)(b).
280. Id. § 895.03(1).
281. Bee Line Entm’t Partners v. State, 791 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(“‘Racketeering activity’ is defined broadly by Florida’s RICO law.”); see supra notes 271–74
and accompanying text.
282. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(1)(a)(40).
283. Id. § 895.02(1)(b).
284. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
285. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2012).
286. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.05.
287. Id. § 775.082(4)(c).
288. Bass v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 516 So. 2d 1011, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
289. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(1)(a) (providing that extortion under Florida Statutes
§ 836.05 constitutes “racketeering activity” under the Florida RICO Act); id. § 895.05
(providing a civil remedy for violations of the Florida RICO Act).
290. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
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position.291
B. Statutory Reform
Most people get their information via a Google search, not
from requesting the records of an individual police
department . . . .
The best access to records—be them [sic] town board
meeting minutes or mugshots—shouldn’t be through a site
that is paid for protecting the privacy of one individual over
another. It should come from a government body that
prohibits that patronage in favor of accuracy and context.
There should be a central hub for all public records and not
their current scattered online state. Without such a
repository, the public is left with private enterprises like
[those in the Mugshot Racket]. It’s a reality that is likely to
remain, as state offices are quite fond of collecting FOIA
fees.292
Although the Florida RICO Act may provide a successful cause of
action, a more lasting and realistic solution to the problem posed by the
Mugshot Racket would be to criminalize the reposting of mugshots and
arrest information on private websites. As noted above, mugshot
website owners claim to provide the public service of disseminating
arrest records, but this purpose is already served by law enforcement
websites in Florida that post the material in the first place.293 If mugshot
website owners were sincere in their claim, they would simply post the
photos without all of the deprecating trappings that adorn their
websites.294 They would also not charge a fee for removal.295
Legislation making such activity illegal would go a long way to
solving this problem because it would remove the protection afforded
by Florida’s public records laws.296 Florida’s commitment to open and
accessible public records could be preserved by laws establishing a
central, state-operated repository where each county could log its
arrests.297 Public access to arrest information could be regulated
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See supra notes 256–266 and accompanying text.
Silverman, supra note 6.
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See Justin Silverman, The ‘Mugshot Racket’ II: A Commercial Purpose Exemption?,
DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (May 14, 2012), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2012/mugshot-racket-iicommercial-purpose-exemption (“Because there is no central repository for public records,
mugshot websites can exploit state FOI laws and profit from what seems like a shady practice.
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according to a standardized policy in conformity with the state’s public
records laws. This central repository would likely bring continuity to a
system in which access currently differs from county to county
throughout Florida. The central repository would also likely preclude
mugshot website owners from acting as “gatekeeper[s] to embarrassing
information.”298 Moreover, such a policy would be more consistent with
the statutory duty to disclose records stated in § 119.01(1) of the state’s
public records laws: access to government information granted by the
state or state agency to interested individuals, not secondarily by private
entities bent on making a dollar.299 “Until the states get involved in
aggregating public records, we’re left with private entities like these
mugshot websites to fill the gap . . . . States need to get better at turning
their public records into visible ones.”300
The move towards statutory reform addressing the Mugshot Racket
has already begun in many states. For example, Utah,301 Georgia,302
Oregon,303 Texas,304 and Illinois305 have all passed legislation
restricting, penalizing, or prohibiting the republication of mugshots on
privately owned websites. Recently, Florida Representative Carl
Zimmermann, a Democrat from Palm Harbor, Florida, proposed a bill in
the Florida House of Representatives that would require mugshot
websites to remove images within fifteen days of being notified that the

The practice seems shady because there’s a degree of unfairness when a private company plays
gatekeeper to embarrassing information and then charges a heavy toll to keep it quiet.”).
298. Id.; see supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text.
299. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 272 of the 2013 Reg.
Sess. of the 23rd Legis.) (“It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal
records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access to public
records is a duty of each agency.” (emphasis added)).
300. Silverman, supra note 6.
301. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-30(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 2d Sp. Sess.)
(prohibiting sheriffs from providing copies of a booking photograph to persons if the
photograph will be placed in publication or on a website and removal of the booking photograph
requires payment of a fee); id. § 17-22-30-(3) (requiring persons who request a copy of booking
photographs to submit a signed statement affirming that the photograph will not be placed on a
website that charges removal fees).
302. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393.5(b.1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Reg.
Sess.) (providing a procedure for removing mugshots from websites “without fee or
compensation”).
303. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.806 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 Reg. and
Sp. Sessions) (requiring websites that disseminate mugshots and charge a removal fee to remove
the mugshots upon request and without charge).
304. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 109.001(2)(B), 109.006(a) (West, Westlaw though
end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83rd Legis.).
305. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 / 2QQQ (2014).
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defendant pictured was not convicted of the crime charged.306 The bill
did “not differentiate between government-run websites, news websites
or those operated by commercial website operators,”307 and established
a “$100 per instance per week” fine for photos not removed during the
fifteen-day grace period.308 The bill also provided for “a presumption of
defamation of character of the person” after a forty-five day period of
noncompliance.309 An identical bill was also introduced in the Florida
Senate on March 5, 2013.310
Unfortunately, on May 3, 2013, the Florida Legislature allowed both
of these proposed pieces of legislation to die in committee.311
Undaunted, members of both the Florida House of Representatives and
the Florida Senate have recently proposed two new bills that target
mugshot websites more specifically.312 In the Florida House,
Representatives Carlos Trujillo, Charles E. Van Zant, and Carl F. “Z”
Zimmerman have sponsored House Bill 265.313 Currently up for
consideration in the House Judiciary Committee,314 the bill states that
“[a] county or municipal detention facility may not electronically
publish or electronically disseminate an arrest booking photograph of an
arrestee who is charged with, but not yet convicted of, a criminal
offense.”315 By targeting county and municipal law enforcement
agencies and preventing them from posting mugshots online before a
306. H.R. 677, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); Under Proposed Law Websites Could Be
Forced to Delete Some Mugshots, GAINESVILLE SUN (last modified Feb. 13, 2013, 4:07 PM),
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20130213/WIRE/130219812.
307. Under Proposed Law Websites Could Be Forced to Delete Some Mugshots, supra
note 306.
308. H.R. 677 (“Failure of the website operator to remove the person’s name or personal
information shall result in a civil penalty of $100 per instance per week . . . .”).
309. Id.
310. S.B. 1060, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013).
311. SB 1060: Websites Containing Information Concerning Persons Charged with
Crimes, FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/1060 (last visited May 19,
2014) (stating that Senate Bill 1060 was allowed to die in the Communications, Energy, and
Public Utilities Committee); see also HB 677–Websites Containing Information Concerning
Persons Charged with Crimes, FLA. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=49897 (last visited May 19, 2014) (stating that House Bill
677 was allowed to die in the Civil Justice Subcommittee).
312. See House Bill 0265, FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/0265 (last
SENATE,
visited
May
19,
2014);
see
also
Senate
Bill
0298,
FLA.
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/0298 (last visited May 19, 2014).
313. See House Bill 0265, FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/0265
(last visited May 19, 2014).
314. Id.
315. H.R. 265, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014). The bill does not apply to certain
“governmental entities” or “third parties that provide electronic criminal justice services to
criminal justice agencies.” Id. Also, it does not apply to “any entity if the sheriff or police chief,
or a designee thereof, decides such publication is necessary to protect public safety.” Id.
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defendant has been convicted, the bill would deprive the mugshot
websites of a large number of photos they would otherwise have access
to shortly after an arrest is made. The bill would also protect innocentuntil-proven-guilty arrestees from the shame that would accompany
their mugshot being posted all over the Internet.316 If enacted, the bill
will become effective on October 10, 2014.317
In the Florida Senate, Senators Maria Lorts Sachs, Charles S.
“Charlie” Dean, Sr., and Darren Soto have proposed Senate Bill 298.318
Unlike House Bill 265, this bill targets the mugshot websites directly
(rather than law enforcement agencies) by prohibiting any person
engaged in the business from “solicit[ing] or accept[ing] a fee or other
consideration to remove, correct, or modify an arrest booking
photograph of an arrestee.”319 The bill also provides that Florida courts
may provide a fourteen-day window for mugshot websites to comply
with a court order to remove a mugshot, and requires courts to “impose
a civil penalty of $1,000 per day for each day of noncompliance with
the order.”320 By prohibiting the websites from collecting fees for
removing mugshots and imposing substantial fines for noncompliance
with court orders to take them down, this bill could substantially reduce
the profitability of the Mugshot Racket and possibly lead to its demise
in Florida. If enacted, this bill will also become effective on October 1,
2014.321
While these newly proposed bills are encouraging, there is no
guarantee they will be enacted. If they do not pass, there is another way
the Mugshot Racket could be regulated. Under article I, section 24 of
the Florida Constitution, the Florida Legislature has the power to create
exceptions to the disclosure of public records.322 An exception could be
made delaying or restricting the immediate release of mugshots on law
enforcement websites. This exception could at least decrease the
likelihood that defendants whose charges have been dropped will later
appear on the mugshot websites.

316. It is important to note that House Bill 265 only refers to the electronic posting of
booking photographs. See id. These images and records would still be accessible to interested
members of the public, “but interested parties, like the media and commercial websites devoted
to displaying mugshots, would need [to make] an individual public records request for each one
and law enforcement could require payment.” Matthew Beaton, Bills Target Online Mugshots,
NEWS HERALD (Mar. 10, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.newsherald.com/news/government/billstarget-online-mugshots-documents-1.281842.
317. H.R. 265, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014).
318. S.B. 298, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
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C. Shifts in Policy
The downfall of the Mugshot Racket may be brought about not by
new legislation or litigation but by the very services that enable the
mugshot website businesses to thrive: Google, major credit card
companies, and online payment services.
As mentioned above, the mugshot websites depend in large part on
search engines such as Google.323 Google’s search algorithms are
specifically designed to display results that “reflect both relevance and
popularity,” and as a result the algorithms take into account the amount
of time a user spends on a website the user found while conducting a
Google search.324 When individuals spend more time on a specific
website, that website earns a higher relevancy rating and is therefore
more likely to appear in other users’ search results.325 Because many
visitors to mugshot websites spend considerable time perusing the
material they find, the websites enjoy a very high relevancy rating and
consequently are often displayed on the first page of related search
results.326 This increases the likelihood that people will visit the site and
perpetuates the cycle.327
In response to complaints about the mugshot websites, Google
recently stated its disapproval of the mugshot website enterprise and
changed its search algorithm.328 As a result, many mugshot websites no
longer appear on the first page of results, adding a little more “practical
obscurity” to one’s booking photo.329 It is still unclear what effect this
change will have on the mugshot website industry, but it is conceivable
that individuals will be less likely to pay large sums of money to
remove a photo when the photo no longer appears on the first page of
the results. It is also possible that a drop in relevancy could lead to
fewer visitors to the website, which could in turn reduce the number of
companies willing to advertise on these websites.330
Additionally, many major credit card companies and online payment
323. David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html.
324. See id.
325. See id. (noting that Google deems sites more relevant when users click on a given
link, “stare in disbelief, and look around a bit” because such users are staying on the page
“rather than returning immediately to the search results”).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. Id. (noting that in response to complaints about the mugshot websites, Google
introduced an algorithm change that decreased the position of mugshot websites in a basic
image search).
329. Id. (noting that the algorithm change effectively demoted certain mugshot websites,
spelling “very bad news” for the website owners); see also supra notes 7–8 and accompanying
text.
330. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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services have recently terminated their relationship with mugshot
removal businesses.331 As of this writing, MasterCard, American
Express, Discover, and PayPal had all discontinued their business
relationships with the mugshot websites with which they had been
previously affiliated, and Visa was considering the same course.332
These developments are encouraging because if the mugshot
websites are no longer feasible or profitable to operate, the business
could cease to exist entirely without the need for new legislation or
lengthy litigation.
CONCLUSION
Arrest records undoubtedly serve an important function in many
aspects of society, and the public may have a legitimate interest in them.
Given the highly sensitive and personal nature of arrest records and
mugshots, however, states should regulate the release of this
information before making it available to the general public. Florida’s
liberal public records laws have allowed law enforcement agencies
throughout the state to independently determine how to make arrest
records available to the public. While some agencies are somewhat
restrictive, others freely post the information on their websites. Mugshot
website owners have utilized easy access to this information to create a
new industry, which arguably extorts money from arrestees under the
threat of advertising their past transgressions much more broadly than
done by law enforcement websites. This has resulted in the loss of the
notion of “practical obscurity” in Florida.
As evidenced by Florida’s laws concerning privacy and the
accessibility of public records, the state is steadfastly committed to its
current position as a leader in government transparency in the United
States. This attitude is also reflected in Florida state court decisions.
Given this dedication, and the Florida Legislature’s rejection of
legislation designed to ameliorate the problem, it is unlikely that Florida
will change its position regarding liberal access to public records. Nor is
this necessarily a bad thing. As the Supreme Court has stated, the
essential purpose behind FOIA laws is “to pierce the veil of
administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny.”333
More than public awareness is at stake, however, when the
information being divulged is as sensitive as a mugshot. While Florida
courts have yet to address the issue of whether a privacy right exists in a
mugshot, the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the U.S. Courts of Appeal
331. See Segal, supra note 323.
332. Id.
333. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of
the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2nd Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, have ruled on similar
matters. With the exception of the Sixth Circuit, which rendered a
distinguishable decision,334 the decisions of the Circuits support
recognizing a privacy right in one’s mugshot.335 These decisions, and
especially the decision of the Eleventh Circuit,336 should prove
instructive in the likely event that a Florida court considers this issue.
If perpetrators of the Mugshot Racket are prosecuted for their
actions, they will likely be charged with extortion.337 While there is a
strong argument that they are in fact extorting people with a checkered
past, it is not entirely clear that a private cause of action can proceed
under Florida’s extortion statute.338 In light of this, a more successful
approach may be to recognize a private cause of action under the
Florida RICO Act, which allows a civil cause of action for extortion.339
Arguably the best way to stop the Mugshot Racket would be to
outlaw the republication of arrest information on private websites and to
create a central repository for this material that is administered by the
state.340 Even though House Bill 265 and Senate Bill 298 are important
steps in the right direction, these bills have yet to be enacted, and they
do not purport to establish a central repository.341 Florida could look to
the states that have passed more stringent privacy protections regarding
the use of a person’s booking photo in order to establish a workable
solution that achieves the goals of both the Sunshine Law and article I,
section 23 of the Florida Constitution. Additionally, the Florida
Legislature could also consider creating an exception to the Sunshine
Law that delays or restricts the immediate release of mugshots pursuant
to its authority under article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution.
Because Florida’s public records laws are so broad, there is potential
for abuse when one considers arrest records and the unregulated use of
the Internet to disseminate them. This abuse is underscored by the
successful rise of the Mugshot Racket. If neither courts nor the
legislature are inclined to provide relief from the actions of
organizations involved in this “business,” perhaps Google and the major
credit card companies can deter the practice. The fact that a defendant
may have been guilty of a crime in the past should not further subject
the person to these extortive activities. In this regard, Florida’s Sunshine
Law leaves much to be desired.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.B.
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 495 (11th Cir. 2011).
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.B.
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